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ORIGINALISM AND A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT 
OVER MARTIAL LAW 
Bernadette Meyler 
ABSTRACT—This Symposium Essay asks what a largely forgotten conflict 
over habeas corpus and martial law in mid-eighteenth-century New York can 
tell us about originalist methods of constitutional interpretation. The episode, 
which involved Abraham Yates, Jr.—later a prominent Antifederalist—as 
well as Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British forces in America, and 
New York Acting Governor James De Lancey, furnishes insights into 
debates about martial law prior to the Founding and indicates that they may 
have bearing on originalist interpretations of the Suspension Clause. It also 
demonstrates how the British imperial context in which the American 
colonies were situated shaped discussions about rights in ways that 
originalism should address. In particular, colonists argued with colonial 
officials both explicitly and implicitly about the extent to which statutes as 
well as common law applied in the colonies. These contested statutory 
schemes should affect how we understand constitutional provisions: for 
example, they might suggest that statutes pertaining to martial law should be 
added to those treating habeas corpus as a backdrop against which to 
interpret the Suspension Clause. Furthermore, the conflict showed the 
significance to members of the Founding generation of the personnel 
applying law, whether military or civilian, rather than the substantive law 
applied; this emphasis could also be significant for how we interpret 
constitutional rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ex parte Milligan made famous the notion that civilians should be tried 
by ordinary courts when those remained open, even when hostilities were 
ongoing.1 There has been much discussion of this claim, from the perspective 
of the Civil War context2 as well as from the vantage point of original 
meaning.3 It has implications for a number of interpretive debates about the 
inclusion—whether explicit or implicit—of emergency powers within the 
U.S. Constitution and the meaning of the Suspension Clause.4 This 
Symposium Essay takes a basically unknown controversy in 1750s New 
York as a window into the complexity of the relationship between habeas 
corpus and martial law in the colonial context as well as the divergent visions 
of common law already emerging between British imperial forces and local 
American interpreters.5 Through demonstrating the contested quality of 
common law both independently and as modified by English statutes within 
the British settler empire of eighteenth-century North America, this episode 
highlights the significance of the imperial setting for understanding the 
original meaning of the Constitution. 
 
 1 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). 
 2 Milligan has alternately been viewed as a “bulwark[] of American liberty” and a political decision 
by Justice David Davis to undermine a use of military courts that was perceived as crucial for attaining 
the goals of Reconstruction. Martin S. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, 118 COLUM. 
L. REV. 323, 443 (2018). For the purposes of this Essay, the petitioner’s claim that the source of the 
claimed presidential authority would rest in “the assumed power to declare what is called martial law” 
furnishes a crucial connection between the writ of habeas corpus and the scope of martial law. Milligan, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 35. 
 3 See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 757, 762–63 (2013) (citing Milligan in treating the questions that originalism should be able to 
answer). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
 5 I have found a couple of references to the dispute in passing, but no full account based upon Yates’s 
notes as well as Loudoun’s treatment and nothing that considers the stakes of the controversy in terms of 
its implications for constitutional meaning. The most thorough discussion of Yates’s interactions with 
Loudoun occurs in RUSSELL SHORTO, REVOLUTION SONG: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING IN SIX 
REMARKABLE LIVES 112–18 (2018). 
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In the late 1750s, Abraham Yates, who later became renowned as an 
Antifederalist, was serving as a sheriff in upstate New York.6 He was 
appointed by Acting Governor James De Lancey and seemed to be holding 
office without particular controversy until the 1756 arrival of John Campbell, 
the Scottish fourth earl of Loudoun, as commander of the British forces in 
America.7 Lord Loudoun (John Campbell)—who had enjoyed an extensive 
military career in Flanders as well as parts of Britain8—was viewed as a less 
than successful leader.9 He was, nevertheless, appointed to coordinate efforts 
in America against the French and the Indians during the Seven Years War.10 
Loudoun’s prolific correspondence upon arriving in America demonstrates 
the skepticism with which he was met in many quarters and his varying 
efforts to overcome the reservations of people and legislatures in several 
colonies.11 
In 1757, Loudoun’s forces took up residence in Albany, where Yates 
was serving. Conflict quickly ensued when Loudoun’s troops broke into the 
jail, over which Yates presided, to imprison a local farmer accused of 
harassing members of the military.12 Yates refused to relinquish the keys to 
 
 6 Id. at 110–11, 416–39. See generally STEFAN BIELINSKI, ABRAHAM YATES, JR. AND THE NEW 
POLITICAL ORDER IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK (1975) (treating the story of Yates and his role during 
and after the American Revolution). 
 7 SHORTO, supra note 5, at 110–12. 
 8 STANLEY MCCRORY PARGELLIS, LORD LOUDOUN IN NORTH AMERICA 42–43 (1933). 
 9 Philip Yorke, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, later “recall[ed] what was said of Loudoun at his 
appointment, that he ‘might be a very good Colonel, but was absolutely unfit for chief command.’” Id. at 
338. 
 10 Id. at 42–43. 
 11 Id. at 167–210 (recounting Loudoun’s difficulties with local assemblies and in quartering soldiers). 
One particularly challenging aspect of the military situation preexisting Loudoun pertained to the 
composition of the troops. Before Loudoun was chosen, British officials had debated what kind of armed 
force to implement in America and, in particular, the proportion of officers and troops to be imported 
from Britain as opposed to raised in America. Id. at 28–31, 41–42. When Loudoun arrived, a provincial 
army composed of forces from both New England and New York was operating under the authority of 
commissions granted to General John Winslow by the Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York 
governors. Id. at 83. The separation of this body from coexisting British regiments carried significant 
legal importance. In 1754, the Mutiny Act, which governed military discipline, had been amended, in 
response to events in East India, to extend British military law to provincial troops serving alongside 
British ones. Id. at 85–86, n.5; see An Act for punishing Mutiny and Desertion of Officers and Soldiers 
in the Service of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies; and for the 
Punishment of Offences Committed in the East-Indies, or at the Island of Saint Helena, (1754) § 9, 7 THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 549. The 
martial law punishments specified by the Mutiny Act would have far exceeded the severity of the common 
law. See PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 86. This Symposium Essay focuses more on civilians’ status with 
regard to military jurisdiction than gradations of authority over the military, but the differentiation among 
even military personnel with respect to the law enforced is highly relevant. In both contexts, the question 
of what substantive legal principles and remedies applied to those accused of wrongdoing was bound up 
with the extent of authority of a commanding officer and his commission. 
 12 See infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
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the jail and got the courts in New York City to issue a writ of habeas corpus, 
at which point he sent the accused there to be heard.13 These acts of resistance 
ignited a firestorm. They incurred the immediate wrath of Lord Loudoun, 
who contended that his authority superseded the force of civilian law, 
claiming that he had frequently heard British Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
declare that, when a military occupation proved necessary, military power 
trumped civilian control.14 On the other side, and in subsequent 
correspondence with Governor De Lancey and others, Yates adduced a string 
of authorities from English law to support the notion that habeas corpus 
could not be suspended under these circumstances.15 
This conflict is a particularly fruitful one to study in order to gain access 
to the disparate perspectives of civil and military officers, and British and 
colonial personnel. Yates himself kept a detailed journal/copybook from 
1754 to 1758,16 and Lord Loudoun’s stint in America yielded more than one 
hundred boxes of materials, including memorandum books and many 
letters.17 The temporal scope of the New York Public Library’s Yates 
collection makes it possible to follow the ideas generated during the 1750s 
through Yates’s stance in the period of constitutional formation. 
The episode detailed here represents the crystallization of a conflict 
over martial law and its status within colonial jurisdictions. It emerged from 
a largely forgotten moment in the genealogy of martial law. Writing in the 
aftermath of the American Civil War, Francis Lieber and his son, Norman 
Lieber, penned a treatise on martial law that was only recently rediscovered 
and has now been edited by Professors John Witt and Will Smiley.18 The 
Liebers’ work articulates a normative vision of martial law while also 
surveying the relevant British and American history. The sequence of the 
book, however, omits the period treated in this Symposium Essay. Instead, 
the Liebers move from considering the role of martial law in domestic 
English contexts to the British colonial implementation of martial law in the 
late eighteenth century but neglect the formative period of the middle of the 
eighteenth century. By neglecting the formative mid-eighteenth-century 
period, the Liebers and other nineteenth-century commentators set the stage 
for later scholarship, leading to the view common today that, “[p]rior to 
 
 13 See infra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 116–124 and accompanying text. 
 16 Abraham Yates, Jr., Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 4, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library). 
 17 John Campbell (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San 
Marino, CA). 
 18 FRANCIS LIEBER & G. NORMAN LIEBER, TO SAVE THE COUNTRY: A LOST TREATISE ON MARTIAL 
LAW (Will Smiley & John Fabian Witt eds., forthcoming July 2019). 
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1815, America followed the traditional English common-law conception of 
military authority, wherein ‘military jurisdiction extended only to members 
of the armed forces.’”19 
Disregarding this earlier moment when martial law was already a point 
of contention has implications for constitutional interpretation, particularly 
of the Suspension Clause. Professor Amanda Tyler’s book Habeas Corpus 
in Wartime: From the Tower of London to Guantanamo Bay, which has 
become the standard text on the Anglo-American heritage of habeas corpus, 
only treats martial law in the period following the Civil War.20 Her account 
of the English and American experiences in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries instead focuses on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and similar later 
laws on both sides of the Atlantic.21 Professor Tyler’s framing of the issue at 
once demonstrates the importance of English statutes as well as common law 
to the formulation of constitutional principles and also suggests the relevance 
of laws pertaining specifically to habeas corpus. Yet the laws which 
furnished frameworks for martial law, including the Mutiny Act of 1689 and 
its successors,22 as well as various Militia Acts, should, in conjunction with 
the aspects of martial law derived from prerogative powers, also be 
considered part of the background of the Suspension Clause.23 
One argument for cordoning off the Suspension Clause from the martial 
law context is textual: the Clause explicitly speaks of habeas corpus and 
never mentions martial law. At the same time, however, the language of 
rebellion or invasion echoes that of the Mutiny Act and Militia Acts, which 
indicates that perhaps they should be considered in conjunction with each 
other. Another argument for putting martial law to one side when interpreting 
the Suspension Clause derives from the sense that martial law was not of 
particular significance in the eighteenth century outside of England and 
therefore would not have furnished a material component of the original 
meaning of the Constitution. It is the latter claim that the remainder of this 
Essay aims to refute. 
The episode discussed below suggests several modifications of extant 
originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation. First, it raises 
questions about the scope of the common law backdrop informing originalist 
 
 19 Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, The Suspension Power, and the Insurrection 
Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 422 n.220 (2007) (quoting George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The 
Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776–1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 55 (1974)). 
 20 AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO 
GUANTANAMO BAY 182–83, 211 (2017). 
 21 See id.; see also Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2. 
 22 See infra note 47. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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interpretation, and, in particular, how broadly or narrowly to construe the 
relevant legal contexts. Second, it undermines the distinctions that 
originalists at times draw between common law and statutory frameworks as 
well as their relevance to constitutional interpretation.24 Third, it suggests the 
existence of a distinction between British imperial common law and the 
interpretation of the common law by colonial subjects in America within the 
mid-seventeenth century. 
Part I of this Symposium Essay furnishes a brief overview of the 
trajectory of debates about martial law from seventeenth-century England 
through nineteenth-century Britain and America. Part II details the unfolding 
of the controversy over the scope of martial law between Yates and Loudoun 
as well as others on the colonial scene and explores some of the arguments 
used by the various sides. In conclusion, this Essay furnishes an account of 
how this controversy should affect our assessment of the original meaning 
of constitutional provisions, especially in terms of the contrast between 
British imperial practices and domestic American understandings of rights. 
I. FRAMING EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MARTIAL LAW 
Martial law has been notoriously difficult to define within England, the 
British Empire, and countries that, like the United States, at some point freed 
themselves from British dominion—in other words, the range of nations that 
inherited the common law. The corresponding principle within civil law 
countries is the état de siège, or “state of siege,” which originated during the 
French Revolution and involves the temporary replacement of civil by 
military authority.25 Whereas the state of siege “is emphatically a legal 
institution, expressly authorized by the constitutions . . . and organized under 
this authority by a specific statute,” martial law draws on a murkier 
 
 24 This distinction occurs most prominently in the Confrontation Clause context, where Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s distinction between common law and statutes in derogation of the common law shaped 
understanding of the original meaning of confrontation. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004) (construing the Marian statutes of bail and committal narrowly in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment because these laws were viewed as in derogation of the common law); see also Bernadette 
Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 563–65 (2006). 
 25 See Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 634, 637–38 (1942); see 
also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 4–5 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005) (2003); WILLIAM E. 
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 302 (1892) (“The state of siege corresponds 
to martial law in England and the United States. There is, however, this important distinction: what 
lawfully may be done under a state of siege is fixed by statute, while martial law—subject to individual 
responsibility for its enforcement, as before mentioned—is a rule unto itself.”). See generally THÉODORE 
REINACH, DE L’ÉTAT DE SIÈGE ET DES INSTITUTIONS DE SALUT PUBLIC À ROME, EN FRANCE ET DANS 
LES LÉGISLATIONS ÉTRANGÈRES (1885) (furnishing an account of the historical and conceptual genesis 
of the state of siege). 
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combination of legal sources and has been seen by some as simply permitting 
the abrogation of law in its entirety.26 
Before the mid-nineteenth century, common law precepts were often 
disregarded in governing the army, in certain exercises of prerogative power, 
and in times of crisis—especially within colonial contexts.27 Yet it was only 
at that moment that commentators coalesced around the designation “martial 
law” and attempted to define the phrase more rigorously. Prior to that point, 
scattered remarks abound but legal and political actors did not consistently 
refer to martial law. The comprehensive treatises on the subject date from 
that time or later, which presents a historiographical problem. A crucial 
question that emerges is whether martial law in the way that these authors 
envisioned it even existed prior to the nineteenth century.28 Likewise, their 
accounts of the history of martial law are inevitably shaped by the contexts 
in which they themselves were writing, whether that of the American Civil 
War and Reconstruction, the Morant Bay uprising and suppression in 
Jamaica, or American expansion beyond the territorial United States in the 
late nineteenth century. 
The distinction between military law, or the law governing members of 
the armed forces, and martial law proper, which involved the imposition of 
some form of emergency rule, became crucial during the nineteenth century 
and represented perhaps the most widespread aspect of the definition of 
martial law.29 However, as Professor John Collins has explained, this line 
was not drawn earlier.30 It is important, therefore, to place this differentiation 
to one side in considering the eighteenth-century context, as this lens could 
obscure the lines that contemporary actors were actually drawing. With that 
in mind, this Part surveys the debates about martial law in England, the 
British Empire, and America prior to the late nineteenth century. 
Professor Collins’s book Martial Law and English Laws, c. 1500–c. 
1700 furnishes a comprehensive account of the early history of martial law 
in England, a history that he finds much less murky than prior commentators. 
 
 26 Radin, supra note 25, at 637. The petitioner’s argument in Milligan, asserting that “[w]hat is 
ordinarily called martial law is no law at all,” echoes this sentiment. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 
2, 36 (1866). 
 27 See infra notes 31–60 and accompanying text. 
 28 In the context of human rights, Professor Samuel Moyn has, for example, warned us not to delve 
too far back into history for genealogies of ideas that may have relatively recent origins. SAMUEL MOYN, 
THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2012). 
 29 JOHN M. COLLINS, MARTIAL LAW AND ENGLISH LAWS, C. 1500–C. 1700, at 5 (2016); R.W. 
KOSTAL, A JURISPRUDENCE OF POWER: VICTORIAN EMPIRE AND THE RULE OF LAW 221–37 (2005) 
(describing the use of the distinction in the context of the Jamaica Royal Committee’s inquiries as well 
as in William Francis Finlason’s 1866 work, A Treatise on Martial Law). 
 30 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 5. 
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He explains the key differences between martial and common law procedure, 
particularly that the former “was allowed to operate by more informal 
plaints, complaints, or informations, and not by indictments.”31 This aspect 
of martial law rendered it appealing to the Tudor monarchs, who used martial 
law to discipline soldiers and “to punish commoners who had risen against 
them.”32 In the late sixteenth century, summary martial law commissions, 
“which allowed sheriffs, constables, mayors, loyal peers, provost marshals, 
and seneschals to execute vagrants, suspected felons of ill name, and traitors 
upon sight,” became widely used in Ireland.33 Although broadly criticized, 
“[i]deas surrounding summary martial law circulated between England and 
Ireland, transforming martial law practices in both kingdoms in the 
process.”34 In this and subsequent instances, developments in martial law 
took place within the context of England’s expanding empire. 
Diverging from the approach under Roman law, which had removed 
jurisdiction over soldiers from civilian courts, England permitted some 
common law jurisdiction over members of the military.35 Beginning in the 
sixteenth century, however, the monarchy cabined the authority of local 
magistrates over soldiers in garrison towns; although common law judges 
could adjudicate felony cases against soldiers, they could only hear 
misdemeanor cases if they received permission from the suspect’s 
commanding officer.36 In the seventeenth century, local officials grew 
increasingly frustrated with their inability to control soldiers. The response 
of the Privy Council under King Charles I was to furnish mayors, deputy 
lieutenants, and other civilians with the power to implement martial law, 
while continuing to obstruct the efforts of officers of the common law, such 
as justices of the peace, to punish soldiers.37 These issues of local governance 
underlay objections to martial law jurisdiction in the 1620s. 
When Parliament took up the question of martial law in 1628, an 
engagement that left its record in the Petition of Right, the nature of the 
discussion did not reflect these jurisdictional questions.38 Instead, “the focus 
of the debate swayed from the real problems that soldiers presented to county 
officers and the jurisdictional politics the jurists wanted to pursue.”39 Both 
 
 31 Id. at 33. 
 32 Id. at 43. 
 33 Id. at 53. 
 34 Id. at 86. 
 35 Id. at 150. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 138. See generally Lindsay Boynton, Martial Law and the Petition of Right, 79 ENG. HIST. 
REV. 255 (1964) (examining the use of martial law during the early years of King Charles I’s reign). 
 38 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 156. 
 39 Id. 
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Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Selden, two of the foremost jurists of the 
seventeenth century, weighed in with arguments against martial law.40 
The Petition of Right, presented to the ill-fated King Charles in 1628, 
expressed outrage against the Crown for encouraging procedures deviating 
from common law conceptions of due process. Several sections specifically 
took aim against martial law, objecting that “certain Persons have been 
assigned and appointed Commissioners with Power and Authority to proceed 
within the Land, according to the Justice of Martial Law, against such 
Soldiers or Mariners” who committed crimes ranging from misdemeanors to 
felony and murder and, in doing so, could employ the summary proceedings 
of martial law and put those condemned to death.41 However, even while 
expressing concern over the harshness of martial law, the Petition also 
lamented that “sundry grievous Offenders” had escaped punishment because 
of the claim that they could only be tried under martial law and not through 
the ordinary processes of common law.42 
The imposition of martial law was not the Petition of Right’s sole 
concern. It also took up, among other items, the inefficacy of writs of habeas 
corpus against royal detentions. As Section V recriminates King Charles: 
[D]ivers of your Subjects have of late been imprisoned without any Cause 
shewed; and when for their Deliverance they were brought before your Justices 
by Your Majesty’s Writs of Habeas Corpus, there to undergo and receive as the 
Court should order, and their Keepers commanded to certify the Causes of their 
Detainer, no Cause was certified, but that they were detained by Your Majesty’s 
special Command, signified by the Lords of your Privy Council, and yet were 
returned back to several Prisons, without being charged with any Thing to 
which they might make Answer according to the Law.43 
Although the bodies were brought to court, they were not released and 
continued to be held based on secret justifications. Here we see the 
concomitance of concerns about martial law with worries about the 
inefficacy of habeas corpus. 
As commonly interpreted, the Petition of Right, after it was agreed to 
by a reluctant King, barred martial law within England in times of peace. Sir 
Matthew Hale discusses the effect of the Petition briefly in his The History 
of the Common Law of England, which considers martial law among several 
alternatives to common law. As Hale explains, “the Exercise of Martial Law, 
whereby any Person should lose his Life or Member, or Liberty, may not be 
 
 40 Id. at 154–63. 
 41 Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, § 7. 
 42 Id. § 9. 
 43 Id. § 5. 
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permitted in Time of Peace, when the King’s Courts are open for all Persons 
to receive Justice, according to the Laws of the Land. This is in Substance 
declared by the Petition of Right . . . .”44 
During the Restoration and the later part of the seventeenth century, 
martial law flourished within England’s colonial dominions despite the 
Petition of Right, even when war was not taking place. The 1683 charter of 
the East India Company permitted the Company to “[e]xecute and use, 
within the said Plantations, Forts and Places, the Law, called the Martial 
Law, for the Defence of the said Forts, Places and Plantations, against any 
foreign Invasion, or domestic Insurrection or Rebellion . . . .”45 Colonial 
governors, deriving their power from the King’s prerogative, often had the 
authority to impose martial law, although debates about subjecting civilians 
to its jurisdiction even outside of England continued.46 
It was only after 1689, however, that martial law increased its influence 
both within England itself and throughout the empire. The crucial legal 
measure was the Mutiny Act of 1689, which permitted the deployment of 
martial law with regard to soldiers.47 This law was passed the same year as 
the first statutory suspension of habeas and only ten years after passage of 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which is frequently viewed as a foundational 
measure for the Anglo-American understanding of habeas corpus.48 Debate 
raged over whether the Mutiny Act had actually suspended the Petition of 
Right and permitted the use of martial law even outside of wartime. Professor 
Collins convincingly demonstrates that it did, arguing that “parliament 
suspended the Petition of Right for soldiers in the same way that it 
occasionally suspended Habeas Corpus for plotters.”49 Within the eighteenth 
century, as Professor Collins explains, “[t]he Mutiny Act went global” and, 
“[f]rom England to Minorca to Gibraltar and eventually to North America, 
British soldiers were disciplined through the successive passages of the 
statute,” while colonies also enacted their own versions of the law.50 At the 
 
 44 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39–40 (3d ed. 1739). 
 45 CHARTERS GRANTED TO THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM 1601, at 121 (1773) (quoted in 
COLLINS, supra note 29, at 217). 
 46 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 207–47. 
 47 Act for punishing Officers and Soldiers who shall mutiny or desert their Majesties Service, to 
continue till November 1689, and no longer, (1689) § 5, 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA 
CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 416. 
 48 For extensive discussion of this and succeeding suspensions, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS 
CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE, 247–52 (2010); see also Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2. 
 49 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 249. For further discussion, see CHARLES M. CLODE, THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE UNDER MILITARY AND MARTIAL LAW 19–21 (2d ed. rev. 1874). 
 50 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 281–82. 
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same time, prerogative-based versions of martial law coexisted with 
statutory varieties.51 
The Mutiny Act was not the only statute to furnish a framework for 
martial law. Professor Collins points to the Riot Act of 171552 and its 
successors.53 Another law that became increasingly important during the 
eighteenth century was the Militia Act of 1661 and its subsequent revisions. 
The title of the first Militia Act affirmed royal power over the militia, reading 
in full, “An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for 
the present ordering & disposing the same.” The act also indemnified all who 
had, commissioned by the King, “assaulted arrested detained or imprisoned” 
anyone who was “suspected to be Fanatick Sectary or Disturber of the 
Peace . . . .”54 Almost a century later, the Militia Act of 1757 allowed for the 
selection by lottery of a substantial number of men for armed service and 
also provided that “in case of actual Invasion, or upon imminent Danger 
thereof, or in case of Rebellion,” the King could—with notice to Parliament, 
if it were sitting—draw out the militias, who would thereby become subject 
to military discipline for the duration of their service.55 
Notwithstanding these legal frameworks, some commentators 
articulated the view that martial law was simply not law. As Sir Matthew 
Hale explained, “in Truth and Reality it is not a Law, but something indulged 
rather than allowed as a Law; the necessity of Government, Order, and 
Discipline in an Army, is that only which can give those Laws a 
Countenance . . . .”56 Sir William Blackstone took a similar position in the 
eighteenth century, citing Hale and claiming that martial law “is built upon 
no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in [its] decisions . . . .”57 Others 
emphasized the subordination of military to civilian authority within 
England. Swiss-English jurist J.L. De Lolme, read by members of the 
Founding generation in America, foregrounded this point in his 1771 work 
Constitution de l’Angleterre. There he cited the Petition of Right and 
 
 51 Id. at 275. 
 52 The Riot Act (1715) § 5, 5 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE 
LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 8. 
 53 COLLINS, supra note 29, at 272–73. 
 54 An Act declaring the sole Right of the Militia to be in King and for the present ordering & 
disposing the same (1661) § 6, 5 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 308. 
 55 An Act for the better ordering of the Militia Forces in the several Counties of that Part of Great 
Britain called England (1757) § 25, 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE END OF 
THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 80. 
 56 HALE, supra note 44, at 39. 
 57 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 438 (12th ed. rev. 1794). 
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highlighted placement of the military under civilian authority within 
England, exaggerating the stability of this arrangement.58 
Despite the continued development of martial law within the British 
imperial context throughout the eighteenth century, the historiography on 
this subject is limited and somewhat dated, focusing primarily on the 
imposition of martial law during the American Revolution.59 The most 
comprehensive work remains Frederick Bernays Wiener’s 1967 Civilians 
Under Military Justice: The British Practice Since 1689 Especially in North 
America.60 This scholarly gap is especially significant because it leaves the 
impression that the British imperial deployment of martial law gathered 
steam primarily in the nineteenth century when treatises on the subject 
burgeoned. In practice, however, theories and critiques of martial law were 
already circulating across colonial contexts, as illustrated by the episode 
described in Part II. Furthermore, emergence of greater awareness of the 
dynamics of imperial constitutionalism largely postdates the existing work, 
which displays little interest in the imperial context informing the 
development of martial law.61 
One exception is Professor Daniel Hulsebosch’s treatment of the only 
eighteenth-century treatise pertaining to martial law, Stephen Payne Adye’s 
1769 A Treatise on Courts Martial.62 Adye’s work is particularly important 
because its claims run counter to those of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone. He 
discounts Coke and Hale’s statements that someone imposing martial law 
during peacetime could be prosecuted for murder, citing to the Mutiny Act 
 
 58 J.L. DE LOLME, CONSTITUTION DE L’ANGLETERRE 202–27 (1771); see also J.L. DE LOLME, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 447–51, 486 (rev. 1796) (consulted for its English translation). 
 59 See, e.g., DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 157–69 (2005) 
(discussing the effects of martial law’s migration across the Atlantic on New York); David E. Engdahl, 
Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 16–28 (1971) (briefly rehearsing the English and American experience in the eighteenth century 
and suggesting a widespread condemnation of martial law). See generally Arthur N. Gilbert, British 
Military Justice During the American Revolution, 20 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 24 (1979) (focusing 
primarily on courts martial during the American Revolution); Arthur N. Gilbert, Military and Civilian 
Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An Assessment, 17 J. BRIT. STUD. 41 (1978) (comparing crimes 
and procedures between military and civilian tribunals). 
 60 FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE: THE BRITISH PRACTICE 
SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMERICA 32–85 (1967) (treating the use of military justice against 
civilians during the Seven Years War following through 1775). Surprisingly, the book has only three 
mentions of Loudoun and none of Yates. Id. 
 61 For sources treating the constitution of empire, see generally LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010); LEGAL PLURALISM 
AND EMPIRES, 1500–1850 (Lauren Benton & Richard J. Ross eds., 2013); and HULSEBOSCH, supra note 
59. 
 62 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 59, at 164–65; see also STEPHEN PAYNE ADYE, A TREATISE ON COURTS 
MARTIAL 1, 5–6 (1769). 
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as well as the opinion of Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown—which he 
emphasizes postdated Coke and Hale.63 As Professor Hulsebosch notes, 
Adye, who was himself a member of the British army and served as a judge 
advocate in America, emphasizes the continuity between common and 
martial law, noting, among other aspects, that courts martial involve trial by 
jury.64 While treating martial law as largely a creature of statutory rather than 
common law, Adye at the same time suggests that the statutory procedures 
should be supplemented by common law. As he writes: 
Though Courts Martial proceed by Virtue of a Statute, which like all others was 
made to supply the defects of the common law, which had no authority to take 
cognizance of the crimes therein mentioned, yet as the method of proceeding 
against criminals had been long established, the Act for punishing Officers and 
Soldiers by Martial law has only laid down such rules for the proceedings of 
Courts Martial, as were intended to differ from the usual methods in the 
ordinary Courts of law; it is therefore natural to suppose that where the Act is 
silent, it should be understood that the manner of proceeding at Courts Martial 
be regulated by that of the other established Courts of Judicature.65 
Adye then proceeds to draw upon common law criminal procedure and 
substantive doctrines to flesh out the mechanisms for holding courts martial. 
Although the beginning of Adye’s text touches on other aspects of 
martial law, he largely focuses on judicial proceedings and courts martial. 
An early and suggestive footnote remarks on the deployment of courts 
martial for all cases in colonial outposts like Gibraltar and Minorca where 
civil judicature was not established.66 On the same page, Adye cites Hale and 
unnamed additional authorities for the proposition that, although “[t]he 
Articles of War mention only Officers, Soldiers, and Persons serving with 
the Armies in the Field, being Subject to Martial Law . . . [a]liens, who in a 
hostile Manner invade the Kingdom . . . must be dealt with by Martial 
Law.”67 These are, however, the only remarks that touch upon the scope of 
martial law jurisdiction, and dilemmas involving detention short of trial do 
not arise during the course of the treatise. 
The nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of martial law within 
the British imperial context before, as Professor Thomas Poole has put it, 
 
 63 ADYE, supra note 62, at 5 (“[Hawkins] is of the opinion that ‘where Persons act by Virtue of a 
Commission, which, if it were strictly regular, would undoubtedly give them full Authority, but happens 
to be defective only in some Point of Form, that they are no Way criminal.’”) (quoting WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN bk. 1 at 1, 86 (1716)). 
 64 Id. at 18–19; HULSEBOSCH, supra note 59, at 165; see also WIENER, supra note 60, at 182–88 
(treating Adye). 
 65 ADYE, supra note 62, at 34–35. 
 66 Id. at 7 n.†. 
 67 Id. at 7. 
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“[the] Great War had brought martial law home” to England itself.68 
Concomitantly, martial law emerged as a subject of crucial importance 
during the American Civil War and Reconstruction. Although these periods 
postdate the controversy that forms the subject of Part II, a brief survey helps 
demonstrate how nineteenth-century treatise writers received the prior 
history of martial law, how their accounts emerged out of particular historical 
conflicts and crystallized positions useful to one side or the other in these 
struggles, and how those reflecting on martial law eventually came to define 
it. 
R.W. Kostal’s magisterial work A Jurisprudence of Power illustrates 
nineteenth-century British imperial developments through its comprehensive 
account of the Morant Bay uprising in 1865 Jamaica and its aftermath, 
including the imposition of martial law, the atrocities committed under it, 
and the operations of the Jamaica Committee, a group that lobbied for 
investigation of what took place in Jamaica.69 One of the principal 
nineteenth-century treatments of martial law, W.F. Finlason’s A Treatise on 
Martial Law, explicitly responds to the circumstances in Jamaica, defending 
both the deployment of martial law there and a broad immunity for those 
who had implemented it.70 
Finlason embraces a broad view of martial law, insisting that common 
law itself permits a response in cases of actual rebellion and invasion, and 
that the utility of martial law consists in its capacity to deal more broadly 
with situations of potential discord. As he insists, “It is the state of hostility 
[] which leads to actual insurrection with which martial law deals, and with 
which it deals, in order to prevent actual insurrection, by means of summary 
severity of military rule.”71 The crucial role of the imperial and colonial 
context in this definition is revealed by looking at the footnote to this 
sentence. It first highlights the language of the Irish Rebellion Act of 1798 
and then turns to racist contemplation of what would happen in the colonies 
if “the native population . . . are allowed to rise en masse” before concluding 
that “the stern and summary severity of martial law” represents the only 
 
 68 THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW, PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE 206 (2015). The dynamic 
here is similar to what Professor Binyamin Blum has described with respect to the imperial development 
of the law of evidence. See generally Binyamin Blum, The Hounds of Empire: Forensic Dog Tracking in 
Britain and Its Colonies, 1888–1953, 35 L. & HIST. REV. 621 (2017) (exploring colonialism’s role in 
shaping modern forensic culture). 
 69 See generally KOSTAL, supra note 29. 
 70 W.F. FINLASON, A TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW (1866). 
 71 Id. at 21. 
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answer.72 This is but one example; the specter of colonial unrest pervades the 
entire treatise.73 
In this work, Finlason also restricts the scope of the Petition of Right to 
England itself. He construes its protections narrowly within the territory of 
England but also insists that,  
as the Petition of Right does not extend to the foreign dominions of the Crown, 
the exercise of the prerogative by Governors, representatives of the Crown in 
colonies or dependencies where the English law prevails, is still less limited, 
and fully exists as at common law, apart from any statutable law.74 
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the American Civil War occasioned its 
own set of debates about martial law, which continued into Reconstruction. 
One of the most important Supreme Court cases on the subject, Ex parte 
Milligan, was decided in 1866, the same year Finlason’s treatise appeared.75 
Lambdin Milligan, an Indiana resident who was involved with the Sons of 
Liberty, a group of northern Confederate sympathizers, was arrested in 1864, 
tried by a military commission, and sentenced to death. He brought a writ of 
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of this proceeding, which the 
Supreme Court granted despite an apparent suspension of the writ. In doing 
so, the Court determined that a civilian could not be tried by military 
commission in a state where the courts remained open and where active 
 
 72 FINLASON, supra note 70, at 21 n.(b). In Finlason’s Table of Authorities, he notes that the Irish 
Rebellion Act, 43 Geo. III, c. 117, “expressly reserv[ed] the power of the Crown to declare martial law 
in time of rebellion.” Id. at xlvi. 
 73 For example, Finlason’s argument for not holding officials legally responsible in the aftermath of 
declarations of martial law relies in part on the notion that “it would be perilous to the defence of our 
distant colonies and dependencies, in case of rebellion, if it were understood that Governors and Generals 
who declared, and acted on, martial law, were to be deemed guilty of wholesale murder, and entirely 
dependent on the indulgence of a bill of indemnity.” Id. at xxviii. 
 74 Id. at 46. 
 75 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Much ink has been spilled on the interpretation of Milligan as well as 
its relation to other cases involving military tribunals and the suspension of habeas corpus, including Ex 
parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861), and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 
1 (1942). See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: 
An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 387–89 (2010) (contrasting Milligan 
and Quirin in discussion of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten 
Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 917, 995–96, 1004–17 (2012) 
(considering Milligan and Quirin in the context of the history of the Suspension Clause). See generally 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 311 (2012) 
(explaining the significance of Milligan for the use of military commissions and martial law during 
Reconstruction); Vladeck, supra note 19 (treating the typologies of military jurisdiction from Chief 
Justice Salmon Chase’s separate opinion in Milligan in relation to his arguments about martial law’s 
effect on the suspension of habeas corpus); John Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: Or Merryman and Milligan 
and McCardle, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 505 (2009) (discussing how Civil War-era habeas cases demonstrate 
the deferential attitude of the Supreme Court to other branches of government during wartime). 
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hostilities were not ongoing.76 Justice Davis’s opinion for the majority 
rejected the broad, Finlason view, deeming the threat of an invasion 
insufficient to justify employment of martial law.77 Even though “[t]he 
necessities of the service, during the late Rebellion, required that the loyal 
states should be placed within the limits of certain military districts and 
commanders appointed in them,” this in and of itself did not “constitute[] 
them the theatre of military operations.”78 
Although concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Chase wrote 
separately, along with three other Justices, and stated that Congress had the 
power under the Constitution to set up military commissions as well as to 
suspend habeas corpus, but had not done so in this instance.79 Toward the 
conclusion of his opinion, Chase proceeded to define martial law and 
distinguish it from two concepts in the same family: 
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be 
exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war 
without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war 
within states or districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third 
to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the  
United States, or during rebellion within the limits of states maintaining 
adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its 
exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under military law . . . ; 
the second may be distinguished as military government, superseding, as far as 
may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military 
commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied 
sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated martial law proper, 
and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of 
Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by 
the President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, 
within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures 
public safety and private rights.80 
According to this interpretation, “martial law proper” takes over only in the 
absence of the protections of ordinary law during times of war or rebellion. 
On the other side, military law involves only regulation of the army both in 
times of peace and those of war. Military government represents an 
intriguing intermediate category, permitting a military commander to take 
control over a territory. 
 
 76 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121–27. 
 77 Id. at 124–25. 
 78 Id. at 126. 
 79 Id. at 140–41 (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
 80 Id. at 141–42. 
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It was in response to the turmoil of the Civil War and the efforts of 
Reconstruction that Francis Lieber, who penned the code that President 
Lincoln used to guide the Union Army, and his son, Norman Lieber, 
composed a treatise on martial law that has heretofore remained in 
manuscript.81 The Liebers’ treatise remarks on the relative recentness of what 
they deem martial law proper, a condition of necessity in which the nation’s 
natural right to collective self-defense allowed for the suspension of ordinary 
law.82 They date the emergence of this understanding to the Irish Rebellion 
of 1798, thus cordoning off most of the eighteenth century.83 They likewise 
distinguish martial law not only from military law but also from military or 
martial rule, writing that whereas martial law covers a country’s own citizens 
and subjects,84 martial rule pertains to foreign enemies or occupations.85 
Nevertheless, they admit some limited cases between domestic and foreign 
exercises of martial law, particularly with respect to civil war, when a 
country splits into two groups of citizens.86 
Under the Liebers’ account, martial law derived its authority from 
prerogative powers as well as statutes. Martial law as they conceived it did 
not, they believed, violate the Constitution. Instead, the Liebers read a 
background principle of necessity into the Constitution, insisting that “the 
Constitution, in some of its provisions, recognizes the law of necessity as 
qualifying those of otherwise general application.”87 
They also resurrected an earlier, multifaceted definition of martial law 
from the 1863 “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field,” a code that Francis Lieber composed, which did not 
 
 81 Professor John Witt revealed Lieber’s extraordinary role in creating this code and its importance 
in establishing a law of war in LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012). 
WITT, supra note 75. Professor Witt and Professor Will Smiley have edited the Liebers’ treatise in a 
forthcoming book. See LIEBER & LIEBER, supra note 18. All citations are taken with permission from 
their edition. 
 82 Professors Smiley and Witt discuss the Liebers’ justifying principle comprehensively in their 
Introduction. LIEBER & LIEBER, supra note 18, at 34–35. 
 83 Id. at 175. 
 84 Id. at 90 (“Martial Rule, or Military Government, relates to the occupied territory of an enemy; 
Martial Law Proper, strictly speaking, to the inhabitants of a district, belonging, and maintaining 
allegiance to, the country by whose military authority it is enforced.”). 
 85 Id. at 98 (“Martial Law Proper then is an enforcement by a country of the law of war with reference 
to its own subjects. It is the law of necessity applied at home in a time of war. It is an exercise of military 
authority, over persons, property, or rights, not ordinarily subject to such jurisdiction. It for the time being 
suspends the administration of the ordinary law whenever, and in so far as, it is necessary to the national 
defence. And it extends to all parts of the country, not treated as belligerent, (to which the martial law of 
hostile occupation would apply) where such necessity exists.”). 
 86 Id. at 90. 
 87 Id. at 94. 
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explicitly cover the case of domestic imposition of martial law. The 
“Instructions” specified: 
1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence 
of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or occupying 
army . . . . 
2. Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by 
special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief . . . . 
3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the 
occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic 
administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the 
substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of 
general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution 
or dictation. 
The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all 
civil and penal law shall continue, either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, 
unless otherwise ordered by the military authority. 
4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the 
laws and usages of war. . . . 
5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied 
and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or 
regions where actual hostilities exist, or are expected and must be prepared for. 
Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander’s own country—
when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the 
case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion.88 
Several aspects of the “Instructions” are noteworthy here. First, they specify 
that military commanders could permit the continued administration of civil 
laws. Second, they differentiate between the kind of martial law that should 
be applied in “places and countries fully occupied and fairly conquered” and 
that appropriate for “places or regions where actual hostilities exist.” Both 
of these distinctions are pertinent to colonial settings as well as to civil war. 
Finally, William Birkhimer, who had served in the Union Army, 
became a general, and also acted in a judicial capacity within the army, 
composed the treatise Military Government and Martial Law, first published 
in 1892.89 The text went through several editions; the 1914 version reflects 
Birkhimer’s experience with American expansion in the Philippines—where 
 
 88 LIEBER & LIEBER, supra note 18, at 78–79. 
 89 BIRKHIMER, supra note 25. 
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he had been an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines—
as well as in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and internal conflict with the Shoshone.90 
Birkhimer is greatly indebted to Lieber, whose manuscript treatise he 
cites, and he adopts Lieber’s view of martial law as justified only by 
necessity.91 He also invokes a proportionality principle, explaining that 
“neither enemy property nor life shall be sacrificed unless thereby the 
military interests of the belligerent are proportionately subserved.”92 It is 
worth dwelling on several aspects of Birkhimer’s account of martial law, 
particularly his insistence on military over civil authority, his defense of 
Congress’s capacity to institute martial law, and his conception of martial 
law as not entirely distinct from but instead an outgrowth of common law. 
More than some other commentators, and perhaps partly because of his 
own military background and identity, Birkhimer emphasizes that military 
authorities assume command over civilian ones under martial law. Hence, 
although civil institutions may be retained, they operate under military 
control: 
All military is in one sense martial rule, for in its essence it is the law of 
arms. Still, because of the unusual relation of the military to the civil power, 
when for the time being in friendly territory the latter gives way to the sway of 
the former, it is necessary to have some term by which military rule under these 
circumstances shall be designated, and that selected is martial law. This law is 
invoked as an extreme measure which pressing necessity alone can justify. 
It is not asserted that both martial law and the municipal law sub modo may 
not be enforced over the same territory at the same time; for where martial law 
is instituted by legislative act there is nothing to prevent the civil administration 
from being retained, although the military is made predominant, the limits of 
each being defined. Similarly the executive officer who enforces martial law 
may bring the civil power to his assistance. The effect, however, of martial law 
 
 90 As the Preface to the Second (Revised) Edition reads, “Since this work was published (1892) the 
military authorities of the United States, and those of Great Britain, have had occasion to inaugurate and 
enforce military government on an extensive scale and under varied circumstances. The first mentioned 
did this in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands; the last mentioned in the South African 
republics . . . . During the twelve years last past there have been several conspicuous instances of 
enforcing martial law within the United States. In Idaho, in 1899, the Governor declared Shoshone County 
to be in a state of insurrection and rebellion, and instituted martial law therein.” WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW, at vii (Franklin Hudson Pub. Co. 3d ed. rev. 1914) (1892). 
For biographical details about Birkhimer, see generally William Edward Birkhimer, ARLINGTON 
CEMETERY, http://arlingtoncemetery.net/wbirkhim.htm [https://perma.cc/D3VA-MEFP]. 
 91 BIRKHIMER, supra note 25, at 300–01. 
 92 Id. at 9. 
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is either to supersede the municipal law wholly or the latter is retained 
subordinate to the former.93 
According to Birkhimer’s conception, two options are possible: either the 
military assumes complete control over the territory in which martial law is 
in force, or civil administration remains but is placed beneath the military 
authority. 
Birkhimer also furnishes a lengthy defense of Congress’s capacity to 
implement martial law, attempting to refute the claim that “martial law 
power is essentially executive in its nature.”94 In doing so, he invokes the 
War Powers Clause and cites to the precedent of statutes that Congress 
passed, including congressional acts of indemnity following exercise of 
martial law powers and the Reconstruction Acts of 1867.95 Acknowledging 
that some might see a congressional power to impose martial law as 
incompatible with Justice Davis’s opinion in Ex parte Milligan, he refrains 
from directly resolving the question but explains that the judicial consensus 
has, at least, altered since the date of that case.96 
Despite affirming Congress’s authority to implement martial law, 
Birkhimer refrains from cordoning martial law off from common law and 
concomitantly suggests that Congress’s power is not absolute. As he writes, 
“[m]artial law has its foundation in reason. It is but a development of the 
principles of the common law,” which, due to its reliance on civil authority, 
“is not suited to the more trying and turbulent times either of invasion or 
rebellion.”97 This gloss on martial law also leads him to emphasize that 
martial law cannot suspend the operations of reason itself, particularly with 
respect to indemnifying governmental actors from the consequences of 
outrageous behavior. Hence he observes that “[i]t is contrary to reason and 
every principle of justice that, under color of law, officers shall be permitted 
to inflict punishment unrestrained, except as prompted by a depraved heart 
and then escape responsibility.”98 Under this account, a period of martial law 
does not remain outside of legality; instead, actions taken during that time 
can produce subsequent repercussions through the regular operations of the 
common law. 
Several important themes emerge from these treatments of martial law. 
One involves the continuity or lack thereof between martial law and common 
law, as well as the extent to which martial law should be seen as a product 
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of statute or as derived from a combination of prerogative and statutory 
powers. Whereas in Tudor England, martial law furnished a mechanism for 
monarchs to circumvent common law, by the late seventeenth century, 
statutes were both setting restrictions on and giving contours to martial law. 
Statutes did not, however, entirely eclipse prerogative versions of martial 
law, particularly in the colonial context, where disputes over the force of 
English statutes were ongoing and colonial governors derived powers from 
the Crown. In the late eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, from 
Stephen Payne Adye’s Treatise on Courts Martial through William 
Birkhimer’s Military Government and Martial Law, some commentators 
attempted to reconcile martial with common law.99 
Another commonality concerns the emerging distinction among the 
objects of the exercise of military authority, whether a country’s own 
citizens, enemies, or residents of an occupied territory. Both Chief Justice 
Chase’s opinion in Milligan and Francis Lieber’s “Instructions” 
distinguished the imposition of martial law within an occupied region from 
other varieties of martial law. 
A final issue involves the relative power of military and civilian 
personnel under martial law. Not only were the substantive or procedural 
issues raised by military tribunals in question, but also who was in charge of 
determining the legal framework to be used—a military officer or civil 
authority. Hence Birkhimer considers it possible that municipal legal 
frameworks could remain intact under martial law but subject to the 
supervision of military rather than civilian authorities. 
While these themes could be found on the surface of nineteenth-century 
discussions of martial law, some cognate concerns manifest themselves 
within the eighteenth-century dispute in colonial New York that the 
following Part treats. 
II. “IN EVERY COUNTRY, THAT REQUIRES AN ARMY TO DEFEND IT” 
The relative dearth of contemporaneous accounts of martial law within 
the eighteenth century and subsequent treatises’ neglect of the period give 
the impression that most significant contemplation of martial law postdates 
the Founding Era. The mid-eighteenth-century dispute considered in this 
Part not only calls that view into question but also indicates how assertions 
of one form of martial law—that associated with occupation—had 
implications for accessing the writ of habeas corpus. 
The French and Indian War, which subsequently expanded into the 
global Seven Years’ War, commenced in 1754. Both Britain and France sent 
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military forces from the metropole to their colonies as part of the war, and 
each allied with different indigenous constituencies. The experience of the 
first British commander, General Edward Braddock, was disastrous, and he 
died in 1755.100 As the British contemplated the nature and extent of support 
they would furnish to their American colonies, Lord Loudoun was chosen to 
command the forces.101 He arrived in America in 1756 and proceeded to 
travel, negotiate, and fight extensively until he was summarily recalled after 
only two years.102 During his stint, he spent some time in Albany, along with 
various troops of both local colonial and British origin.103 
On October 7, 1757, a number of soldiers escorted one Jacob Van Der 
Werken into the Albany City Hall with their bayonets fixed upon him.104 Van 
Der Werken’s farm had been plagued by oxen who belonged to “the New 
England people,” part of the military forces stationed locally, but he had not 
been able to determine which ones. As a result, during one of the animals’ 
nocturnal visits, in a move reminiscent of the Decameron, he cut several of 
their tails so that he could subsequently identify them and find their 
owners.105 
Once at City Hall, the soldiers demanded that the sheriff, Abraham 
Yates Junior, commit Van Der Werken to gaol. Yates refused, because the 
soldiers could produce no warrant for Van Der Werken’s arrest—or, in 
technical terms, a mittimus. Upon receiving this response, they consulted 
with their leader, Captain Christy, who ordered them to break into the gaol 
and imprison Van Der Werken regardless of the sheriff’s views. 
Yates was not happy with this state of affairs and his papers indicate the 
vigor with which he pursued measures designed to contravene the soldiers’ 
actions. He wrote immediately to the Acting Governor of New York, James 
De Lancey, articulating his view that it would be the “Intire Ruin of a 
Sheriff” not to keep his prisoner safe and that the “freedom” and “Liberty of 
the People In General” depends upon the capacity to retain control over 
prisoners. In later correspondence and memoranda, Yates elaborated upon 
his duty to maintain prisoners safely and mentioned having been fined fifty-
 
 100 PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 30–39. 
 101 Id. at 42. 
 102 Id. at 346. 
 103 Id. at 90. 
 104 The description of this incident is derived, when not noted otherwise, from Abraham Yates’s 
Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 in the Manuscripts and Archives Division of the New York Public 
Library, supra note 16. 
 105 In the second story of the third day of the Decameron, the King attempts to identify a servant who 
has cuckolded him by cutting off a lock of his hair while he is asleep. The servant then promptly removes 
the same piece of all the other servants’ hair so he cannot be identified. GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, 
DECAMERON 165–69 (J. G. Nichols trans., Everyman’s Library 2008) (1353). 
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nine pounds just the prior year when one of his charges escaped. Aside from 
Yates’s personal experience, widespread colonial practice confirmed that he 
had reason to fear: many justice of the peace manuals outlined penalties that 
sheriffs would face for failing to preserve their prisoners.106 
Yet the core of Yates’s objections seemed to stem not only from anxiety 
about any personal repercussions of failing to control his gaol but also from 
an ideological disagreement about the extent of military authority over 
civilian institutions. In this respect, it is possible to discern both what 
historians have often called “moves” and “mentalités,” and conflicts over 
worldview as well as concrete resource constraints.107 As the rhetoric of the 
controversy escalated and additional officials became involved, the legal 
stakes of the dispute became increasingly clear, crystallizing around one 
position espoused by Lord Loudoun and the other advocated by Yates. 
Upon hearing of the gaol break, Yates sought an indictment against 
Captain Christy from the grand jury, which was sitting at the time.108 
Concerned that the soldiers would further appropriate the gaol, Yates then 
ordered his “gaoler not to commit any prisoner in gaol unless by a warrant 
of a magistrate” and “took the keys from him.” An amusing exchange ensued 
between Yates and increasingly high-ranking military officials.109 Yates had 
 
 106 See, e.g., WILLIAM SIMPSON, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH-OFFICER OF 
HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 99 (1761) (“Wherever a person is found guilty . . . of a 
negligent escape of a criminal actually in his custody, he is punishable by fine and imprisonment, 
according to the quality of the offence.”). On the other side, Loudoun himself, in elaborating upon the 
custody arrangements for a prisoner in another case, explained that some sheriffs had allowed those 
subject to military justice to escape. As he writes: 
On this principle I committed this baker to the Provost’s. The Provost[’s] prison[er] was kept in 
one of the rooms of the toan gaol where the sheriff keeps his prisoners. This happened from 
several causes. First there was no other place where the provost could keep his prisoners safe from 
escape. Secondly I could detain no military prisoners in any gaol in America if committed for 
military crimes as the keepers of them have constantly lett them out and I have never been able to 
get any redress. And the Sheriff of New York and his gaoler have been particularly guilty in this 
practice. 
Lord Loudoun, Memorandum Book VII (May 6, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10, 
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 1 Memorandum Book 
Typescript. Although using Yates’s gaol, Loudoun employed a military official to supervise military 
prisoners. 
 107 For a discussion of the differences between moves and mentalités and disputes over their relative 
importance, see GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603–1642, at 224 (1992). 
 108 In the letter explaining this to Governor De Lancey, Yates uses an ambiguous pronoun, explaining 
that “as the Grand Jury was then sitting I applied to them who have indicted him,” where “him” could 
refer back either to Captain Christy or to Jacob Van Der Werken. Subsequent arguments about the 
indictment that Yates recounts, however, pinpoints “him” as Captain Christy. See Abraham Yates’s 
Journals/Copybook 1754–1758, supra note 16. 
 109 The language of Yates’s account here gives a flavor both of his own obstinacy and the concrete 
implications of the dispute: 
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previously cooperated with the military forces, permitting them to employ 
the gaol for their “regular prisoners”—presumably those working in a 
military capacity and being disciplined for an infraction. At this moment, 
Yates’s ideological differences with the British forces do not appear at the 
forefront, but rather his concern about the cost of repairing the broken lock 
and outrage at the soldiers’ insolence in interfering in such a manner with his 
gaol. One might therefore think that immediate conciliation on the part of 
the military would repair the breach and the prior arrangement could be 
reinstated. 
Soon, however, more prominent figures were corralled into the dispute, 
and its consequences became more severe, while, at the same time, Yates 
and community members were working on Van Der Werken’s release. On 
October 11, the farmers whose oxen Van Der Werken had marked gave him 
a certificate stating they were satisfied with what he had done, and requesting 
his release. Van Der Werken also petitioned General Abercromby, asserting 
the circumstances of his actions and asking to be let go. In his response, 
Abercromby explained that he would be “very inclined to take compassion,” 
but would not budge unless the proceeding by indictment that the grand jury 
had commenced was cancelled. Apparently the indictment was not 
cancelled, because Van Der Werken “was kept in gaol until the 31 October 
with two sentries on him”; at that point, Yates received a writ of habeas 
corpus directing Van Der Werken to be brought “before our Trusty and well 
beloved John Chambers Esq. [and] our Second Judge [Daniel Horsmanden] 
to hold Pleas in our Supurean Court” in New York City. As soon as the writ 
of habeas corpus arrived, Yates sent Van Der Werken down to New York 
 
The Next Morning a Corporal came to me and told me that he Wanted to take one of the prisoners 
out—and the Gaoler had told him he had Orders from me to the Contrary and that I had taken the 
Key from him. I told him it was very right and that for the future I not allow them the Liberty of the 
Gaol unless I had satisfaction for the breaking of the gaol the day before. A few minutes after the 
sergeant came he went with the same answer—about ten in the same morning, my gaoler came to 
my house. I was not in, a few minutes after I came, I found the gaoler at my door. [H]e told me the 
[Brigadier Major] was at the City Hall [and] had dem[ande]d him why he did not open the goal. 
[W]hen he told him I had the key he dem[ande]d them again and ordered him immediately to go 
for the sheriff to tell him the Brigadier Major was there. [A]s he was relating the story the Major 
came to my door and had with him four officers of the artillery. [H]e asked one whether I was the 
sheriff I told him I was—he told me I was very civil I answered I did not know what he meant, he 
told me he had sent me a message and never returned him an answer, I told him that I was busy 
receiving his message and by what I observed of it merited no answer—he asked me what I meant 
by not giving the key to open the gaol, I told him because I would not, he said he would make me, 
I told him that then I would do it immediately—and what I meant by it—I told him the day before 
the gaol was broke by the army when it was intire, which was [indecipherable] to that one might 
open it with two fingers—and if the army had authority to brake it the day before when whole sure 
they must have this day authority to open it when broke and were then is this ceremony of turning 
a key to a broken lock I told him I did not understand what he would be at, and thus he left me and 
was very angry. The same day I was spoke to by Capt Abercromby, he told me Gen Abercromby 
had desired him to speak to me concerning my refusing to commit the regular prisoners, as I had 
till then always done it . . . . 
Id. 
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City with an emissary, and he was discharged on the order of Daniel 
Horsmanden on November 9, 1757. 
In the meantime, Lord Loudoun, the commander of the British armed 
forces in America, stepped into the fray. Yates met with him (after noting 
that he had been obliged to wait “a considerable time”) on November 1, and 
the two entered into a heated exchange. According to Yates’s sworn 
memorandum on the subject, which shows care in hedging the relevant 
quotations with alternative language lest Yates’s recollection failed in the 
particulars, “His Lordship told me he had seen the Letter I wrote to Governor 
De Lancey that it (or the contents thereof) were Lies from beginning to the 
End (or ending).” After Yates replied that it was “truth from the beginning 
to the End and not one Word false,” Loudoun voiced his animosity toward 
legal procedures, explaining that “he would have nothing to do with these 
Pettyfogging lawyer[s] who for a couple (or few) shillings would obstruct 
(or trouble) Him in his [business] . . . .” He further “insist[ed] upon my 
Keeping the Prisoner in Gaol notwithstanding the writ . . . .” 
That Loudoun had, in fact, seen the letter is revealed by his 
Memorandum Book entry for October 20, 1757, in which he explains that 
Governor De Lancey had shown him the letter and that “[t]he Lt Govr is to 
writ to the sheriff that if he be not quiet he will bring himself to a great dale 
of trouble . . . .”110 Things went from bad to worse when Yates revealed that 
he had already released Van Der Werken pursuant to the writ. Loudoun 
ranted that Governor De Lancey had informed him that Yates was a 
“troublesome man” and that the Governor would independently 
communicate with Yates.111 More significantly, Loudoun required Yates to 
“go nowhere . . . without his orders.” He also demanded that Yates “[t]end 
upon him every day” by seven in the morning, specifying that if Yates did 
not show up, he would have him “fitched by a file of Musquetiers with their 
Bayenets fixed.” He added a set of threats of retribution “if no end was made 
of the affair of Christie and [Yates] served a Writt on him on Account of the 
Inditement or Bill,” stating that he would take Yates’s own house as a 
hospital for the troops and turn the church into a store. 
The next day, explaining that he had forgotten to record the episode the 
previous evening, Loudoun included his own account of this conversation in 
his Memorandum Books. As he explained,  
 
 110 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Oct. 20, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10, 
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book 
Typescript. 
 111 The remainder of this paragraph again relies on Yates Memorandum/Copybook, 1754–1758, 
supra note 16. 
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The sheriff came to acquaint me he had received a Habeas Corpus for the 
man that was committed by Capt Christie up by the post and that he had 
liberated him.  
I showed him that if I was to have all the harassment from every little lawier 
that would take any cause, lett it be never so bad, I knew what I had a right to 
and I would take the whole. 
He then records having speculated to Major General Abercromby that “this 
was a beginning in order to trie their power, sett on foot by the lawiers with 
the sheriff at their head, and that I thought it fitt for me to putt an end to it.”112 
The following day, November 2, Loudoun proceeded to follow through 
on these menacing statements, telling the Mayor “to make ready to billit 
thirteen hundred men and the staff and to provide them necessaries as wood 
bedding and materials to dress their victuals with and if they did not do it he 
would burn their houses;” Loudoun likewise noted “that he wanted a store 
and would take the church for it and ordered the major to take the benches 
out,” and, finally, told Yates “to empty the gaol that he had prisoners under 
sentence of death . . . and the first that would oppose him he would break his 
head.”113 Loudoun had already expressed concerns in his Memorandum 
Books about quartering troops, so Pargellis may be correct that he simply 
took advantage of the dispute with Yates as an excuse to provide himself 
with necessary resources for the army.114 
Loudoun himself recorded his commands about quartering, writing that 
he sent for the mayor and sheriff and 
told them I had now been among them above a year, that I had given them every 
indulgence in my poer, that last year I had for the troops quartered here, 
demanded nothing but hooseroom, though by the Articles of War I was intitled 
to take good bedes, fier and candel, small beer, vinegar and salt. That since they 
were not satisfied with the indulgences I had given them and had now entered 
into a resolution to trie what was their rights and what was ours, and that in 
order to (do) this were giving every harassment in their power, and stiring up 
 
 112 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10, 
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book 
Typescript. 
 113 Abraham Yates, Jr., Journals/Copybook 1754–1758 (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 4, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library). 
 114 PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 45; Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Oct. 12, 1757) (Loudoun 
Papers: Americana, Box 10, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) (noting 
Loudoun’s discussion of quarters with Governor De Lancey); see also 3 Memorandum Book Typescript. 
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every little lawier to prosecut every publick officer, I was determined to change 
my method and insist upon what I had a right to . . . .115 
He followed this declaration with an order for immediate quartering.116 
While the details of the controversy demonstrate the extent to which it 
emanated from a personality conflict between two forceful and stubborn 
individuals, the November 1 conversation between Yates and Loudoun 
simultaneously crystallized a theoretical source for their differences, one that 
persists throughout subsequent materials documenting the episode. Lord 
Loudoun—as ventriloquized by Yates—opined that  
my Lord Chancellor told him before he Left England that wherever there was a 
Necessity for an army to Maintain a Country that their the Law was not in force 
But that the army were to have the administration, and that those that would 
oppose it ought to be hanged and that Christy did Right in Breaking the Gaol 
when I would not open it For him . . . . 
Loudoun’s attribution of his own position to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke—
although unsupported by additional documentation—is significant because 
it suggests a British imperial policy in development rather than the 
anomalous interpretation of a rogue official. Yates, by contrast, insisted that 
this position was “against the Law of God, Law of England, and the Law of 
Nature,” adducing in support of his own view the Bible (particularly Kings 
17), John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, especially the first seven 
chapters, and various aspects of English law, including the “first section of 
the habeas corpus act”117 and the fifth section of the “petition of right.”118 
Yates’s passing citation of the Habeas Corpus Act placed him on one 
side of an implicit fight about the force of English statutes within the 
American colonies.119 While it was generally acknowledged that any statutes 
in affirmance of the common law passed before 1691 applied in New York 
 
 115 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10, 
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book 
Typescript. 
 116 Lord Loudoun, 9 Memorandum Books (Nov. 2, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: Americana, Box 10, 
Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 3 Memorandum Book 
Typescript. 
 117 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2, 3 STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA, TO THE 
END OF THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1761, at 397–410. The first section mandated that sheriffs bring the body 
of anyone who was the subject of a writ of habeas corpus before the court issuing the writ within three 
days. Id. at § 1. 
 118 Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1, § 5. 
 119 See Tyler, supra note 20, at 64–65 (treating the debates over the applicability of the Habeas 
Corpus Act in America). See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS (1980) (treating the reception of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 throughout the colonies); 
Herbert Alan Johnson, English Statutes in Colonial New York, 58 N.Y. HISTORY 277 (1977) (addressing 
how these battle lines were drawn in colonial New York). 
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as well, in 1764, Chief Justice Daniel Horsmanden—the same judge who had 
released Van Der Werken—would articulate the position widely held among 
colonial lawyers that all pre-1691 statutes in derogation of the common law 
were also in force.120 New York lawyer William Smith had already expressed 
the same view in 1756.121 Yet some pre-1691 English statutes were not used 
in New York and some post-1691 laws were. Furthermore, the Privy 
Council’s Committee of Trade and Plantations had previously vetoed New 
York’s “Charter of Liberties and Privileges” on the grounds that the Habeas 
Corpus Act did not extend to America.122 Hence colonial lawyers did not 
voice a truism when representing habeas corpus in New York as protected 
by the Habeas Corpus Act as well as the common law writ, but instead 
adopted a contested position. 
Loudoun’s spat with Yates was not the only instance in which Loudoun 
assumed control over a civilian offender. In May of 1757, Loudoun took 
issue with a New York baker, who deliberately used sour flour. He 
committed the baker to the provost marshal and kept in the latter’s room at 
the gaol.123 Loudoun justified this procedure “by the principle that a power 
was seated in a commanding officer during war for the preservation of the 
troops, and that if the man had been confined in a civilian prison, he would 
have been permitted to escape.”124 
In elaborating on his own view of the underlying legal principles, Yates 
acknowledged that during a rebellion, “the army should have the 
Administration” and that “it would Be absurd to Insist on Liberty or 
Property,” explaining that in “Part of a Country Ready Unavoidably to fall 
In the hands of the enemy I think the army should have the administration to 
Burn and Destroy It for fear the spoil should fall In the hands of the 
 
 120 Johnson, supra note 119, at 279–80; see also THE REPORT OF AN ACTION OF ASSAULT, BATTERY, 
AND WOUNDING, TRIED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR THE PROVINCE OF NEW-YORK, IN 
THE TERM OF OCTOBER 1764, BETWEEN THOMAS FORSEY, PLAINTIFF, AND WADDEL CUNNINGHAM, 
DEFENDANT 9 (1764) (“The Supreme Court here proceeds in the Main, according to the Practice of the 
Courts at Westminster; and the Common Law of England, with the Statutes affirming, or altering it, 
before a Legislature was established here, and those passed since such Establishment, expressly extended 
to us, with our legislative Acts (which are not to be repugnant to the Laws of England) constitute the 
Laws of this Colony.”). 
 121 DUKER, supra note 119, at 111. 
 122 Id. at 108; Johnson, supra note 119, at 281–82. 
 123 PARGELLIS, supra note 8, at 294. 
 124 Id. Pargellis’s account is based upon Loudoun’s Memorandum Books at the Huntington Library, 
although he incorrectly identifies the date as April rather than May. Id. at 295 n.21. The Memorandum 
Books demonstrate that Loudoun’s decision was not uncontested. In an entry from May 1, Loudoun 
details the baker’s crime and explains that “Mr. Santt the laier (lawyer) and his brother came to Sir Charles 
Hardy’s and debated the case.” Lord Loudoun, 7 Memorandum Books (May 1, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: 
Americana, Box 10, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA); see also 
1 Memorandum Book Typescript. 
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Enemy . . . .”125 Yates considered these situations of “emergency” as 
appropriate for the exercise of prerogative powers. Yet they represent limited 
exceptions to the freedom of liberty and property extolled by Locke, to which 
Yates contrasted his conception of French kingship as an absolute power 
vested in the monarch. Under the British system, by contrast, Yates averred, 
the law controls the King and not vice versa. As he maintained:  
The Law is both the measure and the Bond of Every Subjects Duty and 
Allegiance [crossed out twice then spelled again a third time] each man having 
a fixed foundamental Right Born with him as to freedom of his Person and 
Property in his estate which he cannot be Deprived of but either by his Consent 
or some Crime for which the Law has Imposed Such a Penalty or 
Forfeiture . . . . 
A third perspective emerges from Acting Governor De Lancey’s letter 
to which Lord Loudoun had referred, a missive that reached Yates belatedly, 
although dated October 24.126 In the 1720s, De Lancey, who was from a 
prominent New York family and solidified his landholdings by marriage, had 
studied in England at both Cambridge and Lincoln’s Inn prior to becoming 
chief justice in New York.127 Lamenting in his letter that “[I] am sorry there 
Should any difference arise Between the civil and military,” De Lancey 
expressed the view that “the Kings Gaol must Be opened to secure 
delinquents against the Military Law.” At the same time, he distinguished 
between the recourse available to civilians and members of the military, 
explaining that, “if the officers send a Souldier to Gaol as he is subject to 
military Discipline no one can Complain . . . .” On the other hand, “[I]f they 
send a man not subject to their discipline the Law gives him a Remedy which 
he may take . . . .” Hence De Lancey viewed civil law as still applying to 
those in military custody. Nevertheless, he continued, addressing Yates, “in 
neither case are you answerable because they are not in your Custody or your 
prisoners.” According to this view, Van Der Werken would be on his own in 
seeking redress for his injuries and Yates would be deprived of authority 
over his case: “If this van Der Werken Has been injured by any body let him 
Take his remedy against those who did The injury.” The letter concludes 
with a treatment of other army business and instructions about improving the 
highways for the benefit of the troops. Here again the practical 
considerations entailed by the military presence in upstate New York are 
 
 125 This paragraph relies on Abraham Yates’s Journals/Copybook, 1754–1758, supra note 16. 
 126 Id. 
 127 STANLEY NIDER KATZ, NEWCASTLE’S NEW YORK: ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICS, 1732–1753, at 
166 (1968). 
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intermingled with theoretical debates about the nature and extent of military 
authority. 
Loudoun, Yates, and De Lancey thus adopted three disparate positions. 
Loudoun’s view—attributed to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke—approved of 
the suspension of civil law as well as civil remedies like habeas corpus in 
areas requiring military occupation. Yates’s perspective emphasized the 
distinction between two kinds of military necessity and the attendant exercise 
of the King’s prerogative: the first called for during occupation of enemy 
territory or in cases of rebellion, would allow for civil authority to be 
superseded, whereas the second, which he deems applicable to the British 
forces in America, entails the presence of armed forces while civil order 
remains generally in force. Finally, De Lancey distinguished both between 
the objects of military discipline and between the initial exercise of authority 
and the availability of a remedy. Hence, he drew a stark contrast between 
military and civilian personnel yet suggested that even when a civilian is 
involved, military administration should supersede civilian, and that judicial 
remedies are the only recourse available. 
Aspects of these positions would reemerge in later contexts, including, 
most prominently, those of the Civil War. At the same time, they show the 
marks of their peculiar origins at a moment when the expansion of the British 
Empire raised questions about whether British approaches to military 
authority domestically, such as encapsulated in the Petition of Right and 
subsequent legislation, would apply when British forces operated in colonial 
territories and when members of the colonies were beginning to formulate 
arguments—phrased in the terms of English law itself—against what they 
perceived as tyrannical treatment. Under this account, it was not incidental 
that Loudoun attributed the position he espoused to Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke, nor was it a coincidence that Yates would later become a 
prominent Antifederalist. Instead, Loudoun’s view represented a position 
being tried out by British officials developing their relation to prerogative 
powers, particularly in foreign territories, and Yates’s experience 
conditioned his later suspicion of broad federal powers. 
In 1756, the year before this controversy, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
had intervened in debate about a new version of the Militia Bill, one that 
wound up being defeated in the House of Lords.128 In his remarks, Hardwicke 
expressed sympathy for having a domestic militia and dissociated himself 
from views critical of standing armies. At the same time, he opposed the bill 
as infringing on “the Prerogative of the Crown.”129 After rehearsing the 
 
 128 PHILLIP YORKE EARL OF HARDWICKE, TWO SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS. I. ON THE BILL, 
FOR ABOLISHING THE HERETABLE JURISDICTIONS IN SCOTLAND. II. ON THE MILITIA-BILL 43–77 (1758). 
 129 Id. at 45–47. 
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events leading up to King Charles I’s beheading, Hardwicke noted that even 
in the aftermath of the English Revolution, Parliament had affirmed the 
King’s authority over the military upon the Restoration of King Charles II to 
the throne. This bill, by contrast, remained silent on the subject, a silence he 
construes as excluding royal prerogative over the militia. As he concluded, 
“by this Bill, the Power of the Militia is taken away from the Crown.”130 
Hardwicke expressed particular concern about how emergencies that 
might arise would be addressed. The Militia Bill as drafted furnished 
authority to the King to address such circumstances only in a circumscribed 
fashion, specifying that “in case of actual Invasion, or imminent Danger 
thereof; or in case of Rebellion, it shall and may be lawful for his Majesty . . . 
to order and direct his Lieutenants, . . . to draw out and embody all the 
Regiments and Companies of Militia Men . . . .”131 As Hardwicke pointed 
out, however, even this use of power would require a formal notice to 
Parliament and might vitiate the availability of emergency powers when 
Parliament happened to be out of session.132 
His further objection to the bill entailed its displacement of military 
discipline by the civil powers. As he lamented: “The whole Discipline of the 
Militia is by this Bill taken out of the Deputy Lieutenants, and the Officers 
of the Militia, and put into the Justices of the Peace, excepting only at the 
particular Times when they shall be marched out for actual Service.”133 
Military personnel were not even barred from resorting to a writ of certiorari, 
leading Hardwicke to “congratulate my Friends, the Judges of the King’s 
Bench, on their being made Inspectors General of this Army.”134 
Hardwicke hence insisted on royal prerogative powers over the military 
domestically, but I have found few direct indications of his views about 
martial law in the colonies. He did, importantly, defend the principle of not 
extending the Habeas Corpus Act to Ireland in 1758. As Hardwicke 
explained: “It has been often attempted and has as often, in the best of times, 
been rejected on account of the state of Ireland, which made it not safe for 
 
 130 Id. at 54. 
 131 Id. at 51. 
 132 Id. at 52–53. 
 133 Id. at 59. 
 134 Id. at 60–61. When Lord Loudoun was recalled to England, he made a tour of government to 
explain himself and redeem his reputation. During the course of this tour, he received conflicting advice 
about whether to attend debate on this Habeas Corpus Act and ultimately decided not to do so given the 
political sensitivity of the subject. 
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the King’s Protestant subjects there.”135 A similar claim was subsequently 
made regarding Quebec.136 
This argument also bears some resemblance to the one Lord Loudoun 
attributed to Hardwicke, “that wherever there was a Necessity for an army 
to Maintain a Country that their the Law was not in force But that the army 
were to have the administration.” The logic of this statement seems 
particularly applicable to colonial sites rather than the metropole itself. The 
reference itself to “an army to Maintain a Country” suggests an occupying 
force rather than domestic troops called up to put down an insurgency or 
respond to an invading enemy—circumstances that, in any event, Yates 
himself acknowledged might justify having civil authorities temporarily 
cede their power to the military forces. In particular, this argument raises the 
specter of a situation not otherwise specifically contemplated within 
discussions of martial law, the context of a country already conquered and 
subordinated as a colony but in which either domestic resistance or foreign 
conflict over possession produced an armed occupation. 
A further issue pertaining to the respective roles of colonial governors 
and military commanders that was playing out in different colonial sites 
during this period also manifested itself during Lord Loudoun’s stint in 
America. In a private letter dated October 17, 1757, Lord Loudoun 
complains about Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall. Although 
Loudoun claims to be “great friends” with Pownall, he insults him in the 
most opprobrious terms and details a discussion in which he “showed 
[Pownall] the Command was totally Military, that in no shape the Governor 
could have any Command over them, and that if [he] had the Command, it 
must descend in [his] Absence to the next Officer in Rank, and so on to the 
End.”137 He also recounts Pownall expressing the opposing view that “except 
in time of War the Military Power came in to support the Civil; where it 
could not execute its own Orders all Business must stand still and the 
Country be undone.”138 Much of the correspondence between Loudoun and 
Pownall demonstrates the substantial controversy between the two about the 
nature and limits of military and prerogative powers.139 
 
 135 Jean-Marie Fecteau & Douglas Hay, ‘Government by Will and Pleasure Instead of Law’: Military 
Justice and the Legal System in Quebec, 1775–83, in 1 CANADIAN STATE TRIALS: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
SECURITY MEASURES, 1608–1837, at 129, 146 (F. Murray Greenwood & Barry Wright eds., 1996). 
 136 Id. at 159. 
 137 Letter from Loudoun to Cumberland (Oct. 17, 1757), in MILITARY AFFAIRS IN NORTH AMERICA, 
1748–1765: SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE CUMBERLAND PAPERS IN WINDSOR CASTLE 399, 404, 
406 (Stanley Pargellis ed., 1936). 
 138 Id. at 406. 
 139 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Pownall to Lord Loudoun (Nov. 27, 1757) (Loudoun Papers: 
Americana, Box 104, Manuscripts Department, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA) (describing how 
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Turning back to Yates, the effects of the 1750s controversy appear in 
his writings around the Founding Era. In the interim, Yates had imbibed the 
writings of De Lolme, who, as mentioned above, vigorously contrasted the 
English mode of government with continental models, particularly insofar as 
it subordinated the military to the civil aspects of government.140 In The 
Rough Hewer, directed at members of the New York state legislature, 
Yates—joined by his nephew, Robert Yates—expressed the necessity of a 
Bill of Rights, denying that “the Rulers ought to have the power to keep a 
standing army . . . command the Militia, and order them when and where 
they pleased.”141 In rehearsing various historical episodes involving a 
deprivation of liberty, Yates explicitly treated Lord Loudoun and 
summarized what he had taken away from the 1757 controversy. Yates 
wrote: 
The Earl of Loudoun (a gentleman of imperious and arbitrary disposition), was 
said to have so extensive a commission as to be a sort of viceroy; and had, 
besides the command of the army, all the governors from North Carolina to 
New Hampshire, subordinate to him), arrived in 1756 and was for having the 
civil authority subordinate to the Military: He said (and often said) that it was 
the opinion of the Lord Chancellor that it ought to be the case in every Country, 
that required an army to defend it; and of a Piece with this was the order of 
George the 3d (George the 2nd died 5 October 1760) of the 17 December 1760 
Directing the Commander of the troops to Rank above the governor of a 
colony.142 
While he had not forgotten the personal dimension of the quarrel, Yates had 
by this point distilled the ideological kernel of his objections. 
From Yates’s encounter with Loudoun, we can see a different 
dimension of the debates over habeas corpus and martial law. At issue were 
not simply questions of what law would apply—military or civilian—or 
whether remedies might be available after the fact, but who precisely would 
be charged with overseeing the administration of justice. This concern with 
personnel has faded into the background of our understanding of the 
 
he remains bound by laws accepted by his predecessors that cut into the prerogative powers of a 
governor). 
 140 See De Lolme, supra note 58. In his 1786 notes on speeches to the delegates of Congress, Yates 
refers extensively to De Lolme. See Abraham Yates, Jr., “Speeches to the Delegates of Congress” 
(Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 5, Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library). 
 141 Abraham Yates, Jr., “The Rough Hewer” (Dec. 4, 1788) (Abraham Yates, Jr. Papers, Box 5, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, N.Y. Pub. Library). 
 142 Id. 
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Constitution, but it resonates with other Founding Era controversies, such as 
those over the administration of federal law.143 
A similar notion of martial law as changing who was applying the law 
rather than what law was applied would also manifest itself later in the 
history of the British Empire. Reflecting back on his service as a governor in 
India in 1799, the Duke of Wellington proclaimed both the superiority of 
military personnel over civilian during occupation and the lack of any 
necessary implication of that circumstance for the administration of law. As 
he recalled: 
I have, in another country, carried out martial law; that is to say, I have governed 
a large proportion of the population of a country by my own will. But then, what 
did I do? I declared that the country should be governed according to its own 
national law, and I carried into execution that my so declared will . . . . The 
judges sat in the courts of law, conducting their judicial business, and 
administering the law under my direction.144 
The dissociation between the question of military or civilian control of 
government and the mode of carrying out justice that Wellington describes 
had already been suggested by the arguments made in the 1757 controversy 
in upstate New York between Lord Loudoun and Abraham Yates. 
CONCLUSION: THE STAKES FOR ORIGINAL MEANING 
So what, if any, are the implications of this 1757 controversy for 
originalist constitutional interpretation? 
First, the dispute suggests that cordoning off the history of habeas 
corpus from martial law might be a mistake. As noted above, Professor 
Tyler’s comprehensive book on habeas considers the implications of martial 
law only beginning with the American Civil War.145 Others have insisted 
upon a strict demarcation between the historical treatment of habeas corpus 
and martial law.146 On the other side, Professor Vladeck has most 
 
 143 See generally Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 
1104 (2013) (explaining the significance of whether local or federal forces would implement federal law 
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 144 April 1, 1851, in 2 THE SPEECHES OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON IN PARLIAMENT 723–24 (1854). 
 145 TYLER, supra note 20. 
 146 In The Imbecilic Executive, Professor Sai Prakash draws a bright line between the Crown’s 
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comprehensively elaborated the martial law justification for suspension, 
examining an obscure opinion that investigated President Lincoln’s power 
to suspend the writ.147 In deciding the 1862 case of Ex parte Field, U.S. 
District Judge David A. Smalley claimed that, “so long as the President had 
authority to impose martial law, he had authority to suspend the privilege of 
the writ wherever martial law was in force.”148 This authority to impose 
martial law would have derived from early Militia Acts.149 Professor Vladeck 
furnishes a strong historically based defense of Smalley’s position but 
concludes by raising the possibility that a martial law-based suspension of 
habeas might be incompatible with the Suspension Clause. 
Martial law itself, however, as this Essay indicates, furnished part of 
the context out of which the Suspension Clause emerged and, hence, 
provides a potential interpretive backdrop for understanding the meaning of 
the provision. Not only was the first suspension passed the same year as the 
Mutiny Act of 1689, but the dispute between Yates and Loudoun illuminates 
the various arguments that were made in the mid-eighteenth century about 
the relationship between civil law remedies like habeas corpus and martial 
law. Whereas Governor De Lancey believed that those held in military 
custody could still avail themselves of remedies through the courts of 
common law, Loudoun held that military jurisdiction entirely displaced 
“every little lawier’s” arguments. Likewise, we see in these disputes a 
prefiguration of the arguments that the Duke of Wellington and William 
Birkhimer would later make that the courts could remain open even under 
martial law. 
Second, originalists have, in other contexts, tended to draw a strong 
distinction between common law and statutes in derogation thereof, 
interpreting the Constitution in light of the former but distinguishing the 
latter.150 The interplay of statutes with prerogative powers in relation to 
martial law—as well as habeas—suggests both the crucial importance of 
statutes as well as common law to the backdrop of the Constitution and the 
complexity of relying on English statutes as a given within the American 
colonies. In practice, colonists often invoked English laws even if British 
authorities rejected their applicability within the colonies.151 This raises 
interpretive questions about which understanding should be accepted and 
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whether local interpretations and practices in America should trump British 
conceptions; concluding that they should could further undermine 
originalists’ reliance on late eighteenth-century British sources like William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, which largely encapsulate the British 
perspective.152 Furthermore, the relationship between prerogative and 
statutory deployments of martial law as well as the compatibility of martial 
law with common law was hotly contested within the British Empire.153 In 
addition, once the door is opened to interpreting constitutional provisions 
against a set of British statutes, questions arise as to where the limits of that 
statutory framework might be. In particular, with regard to the Suspension 
Clause, it may not be advisable to restrict investigation to legislation 
pertaining specifically to habeas corpus but rather expand more broadly into 
the range of statutes furnishing guidance for the implementation of martial 
law. 
Finally, this episode demonstrates the extent to which the legal 
framework of England represented not simply a static backdrop for the 
development of the Constitution but a contested and dynamic space in which 
military commanders’ imperial justifications vied with the arguments of 
colonial subjects based on English law and the claims of colonial governors 
caught between their allegiance to the metropole and their attention to the 
domestic legal regimes developing in the colonies and the rights claimed by 
colonists. Within this system, common law and its alternatives did not 
furnish a fixed set of doctrines according to which provisions of the 
Constitution can be interpreted but instead a set of resources for argument in 
a fraught imperial dominion. 
 
 152 For originalists’ tendency to rely on Blackstone, see generally Meyler, supra note 24. 
 153 See supra Part I. 
